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TAXATION-APPORTIONMENT OF
INHERITANCE TAX WHERE CONTINGENT OR
LIMITED INTERESTS ARE PRESENT
The State Tax Commissioner appealed from an order of the
Circuit Court of Ritchie County, West Virginia, which set aside the
Commissioner's deficiency assessment of inheritance tax against
the appellees, remaindermen under the will of Rachel B. Evans.
Under Item V of her will, the testatrix devised the residue of her
estate to her husband for life with power to use and sell and with-
out impeachment for waste, remainder to her two nephews, the
appellees. The Commissioner contended that the will created two
distinct estates and, relying on West Virginia Code chapter eleven,
article eleven, section seven, apportioned the inheritance tax be-
tween the beneficiaries and issued a deficiency judgment against
the remaindermen. Under the statute, the Tax Commissioner may
apportion inheritance taxes among all those who will take where
"only a life estate, or an interest for a term of years, or a contingent
interest" is devised to one person, with the remainder going to
others. The appellees, however, contended that the statute was
inapplicable since the estate devised to the husband was greater
than a life estate. According to this analysis, the life tenant would
be responsible for the entire inheritance tax. Held, affirmed. When
a testator devises a life estate with power to use, sell, dispose of,
or convey, and without impeachment for waste, the estate created
is greater than "only a life estate" and shall bear the entire burden
of the transfer and inheritance taxes. In re Estate of Evans, 194
S.E.2d 379 (W. Va. 1973).
Before the court in Evans could resolve the problem of allocat-
ing inheritance tax liability, it had to determine from a property
law aspect what estates had been created under the devise. Prior
to the enactment of the 1931 Code, West Virginia followed the
minority rule that a devise of a life estate with power to use and
dispose of the property created a fee simple absolute, thereby ren-
dering the remainder under the instrument null and void. The first
clear expression of this rule appeared in the 1906 case of Morgan
v. Morgan.' The court based its decision upon the intent of the
'60 W. Va. 327, 55 S.E. 389 (1906). Morgan centered around a deed which
conveyed a certain tract to A as trustee and to B as beneficiary. Under the deed, A
was to maintain the tract in trust for B to "occupy, possess and enjoy," including
the rents and profits to be derived therefrom, "for and during her life." The deed
further empowered A to "sell or otherwise dispose of said property" at the request
1
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testator, as evidenced by the will. No general rule of construction
concerning the characterization of such an estate was intended.
However, the court's language was later construed to establish a
rule of general application.2 The rule became entrenched in West
Virginia jurisprudence,3 and, although obviously dissatisfied with
it,4 the court continued to follow the rule until it was changed by
legislative enactment in 1931.
The newly enacted statute put West Virginia in line with the
majority rule that where a life estate with the power to use and sell
is created, "the limitation over shall not fail or be defeated except
to the extent that the first taker shall have lawfully exercised such
power of disposal."' Despite the Morgan opinion,6 a subsequent
decision noted that this construction was considered by the legisla-
ture to be closer to the testator's intent.7 Where the testator or
grantor provides for two distinct sets of beneficiaries, granting each
a different interest, a holding that the first taker receives a fee
simple renders the language creating the remainder mere surplu-
sage. Thus, in enacting this statute, the Legislature hoped to give
of B, and if B should die without directing the property to be sold, the remainder
was to pass to B's husband. Id. at 329, 55 S.E. at 390.
21n stressing intent, the court noted that the position of the power within the
clause granting the estate may be evidence of the grantor's intent. Yet the court
continued in the following language which seems favor a more general rule:
Therefore, if the absolute and unlimited power of disposition at pleasure,
whether contained in the same clause in which the gift is made or in a
superadded clause, appears to be the primary or dominant intent dis-
closed by a consideration of the whole instrument, that is, intended to
prevail over the words indicating a life estate, it will be given that effect.
Id. at 333, 55 S.E. at 391.
3E.g., Swann v. Pople, 118 W. Va. 538, 190 S.E. 902 (1937); Brookover v.
Grimm, 118 W. Va. 227, 190 S.E. 697 (1937).
'In Swann v. Pople, 118 W. Va. 538, 190 S.E. 902 (1937), the court noted that
this was not the general rule in the United States. Although speaking favorably of
the majority rule, the court refused to displace the West Virginia rule on the
grounds of stare decisis.
'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-16 (1966).
'The court felt that since the absolute power of disposal was the testator's
primary concern, he intended to create a fee simple in the first taker. 60 W. Va. at
336, 55 S.E. at 393.
'Swann v. Pople, 118 W. Va. 538, 190 S.E. 902 (1937). It should be noted,
however, that the rule applied only where there was an unlimited power of disposal.
In Smith v. Smith, 134 W. Va. 842, 62 S.E.2d 347 (1950), the testator devised
property under a will executed prior to 1931, granting A a life estate with the power
to sell the property if necessary to purchase burial lots, remainder to B and C. The
court found that A took only a life estate because of the limitation placed on her
power of disposal.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss1/10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
effect to the testator's entire devise.
Under the statute, each taker receives a vested interest. The
first taker receives a life estate with a power appendant, which, if
exercised, can destroy the limitation over, and the remainderman
takes a vested remainder subject to divestment.' While the re-
mainderman may never enjoy the estate, his right in it continues."
Despite the fact that each taker under the will of Rachel Evans
received a vested right in the property, the court determined that
only the first taker would be required to pay an inheritance tax.
In so deciding, the court seems to have misconstrued the theory
behind the taxation of inheritances and, more particularly, to have
misapplied the statute dealing with taxation of contingent or lim-
ited interests, all of which may lead to unnecessary complications
in future litigation.
Even though, in terms of traditional property law, the first
taker's interest is equivalent to a life estate," the court, relying on
its "analysis of the economic consequences" assessed the interest
as something more than a classical life estate. Because the life
tenant could elevate his estate to a fee simple, the court felt it
unjust to place any part of the tax burden upon the remaindermen.
This analysis seems to ignore the basic purpose behind inheritance
tax law. As the court stated, an inheritance tax is placed upon the
"right or privilege of acquiring property."'" The remaindermen
under Rachel Evans' will do indeed have a right, although limited,
to acquire the property. This very right characterizes their estate
and, in fact, was recognized by the court in discussing the property
law aspects of the case. 4 Nevertheless, the court failed to apply its
own definition in analyzing the estates for purpose of taxation.
Flesher v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
'Price v. Talkington, 126 W. Va. 263, 27 S.E.2d 705 (1943).
"Flesher v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
" 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 111 (1936) states that a limitation effective to
create a life estate
is not prevented from creating an estate for life, and is not caused to
create some type of estate other than an estate for life, by the fact that
such form of limitation is accompanied by further language effective to
create in favor of the conveyee a power, either limited or unlimited, to
dispose of the complete property in such land.
"In re Estate of Evans, 194 S.E.2d 379, 381 (W. Va. 1973).
'31d. at 382. This rule has been recognized in prior West Virginia decisions, E.g,,
Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958); Central Trust Co. v. State
Tax Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 37, 178 S.E. 520 (1935).
'1194 S.E.2d at 381.
[Vol. 76
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Furthermore, the court placed great emphasis on the market
value of the interest received by the remaindermen in determining
whether they should be subject to tax. Because their chances of
ever enjoying possession of the estate were so slight, they would
receive little on the open market for their interest. Thus, the court
deemed it unfair to require them to contribute.' 5 While the value
of the property interest must necessarily be considered in assessing
the inheritance tax,'" it should not be used as a factor to determine
initial taxability. It is evident from the statutes themselves that
the tax is placed on the "transfer" of property and not on the
property itself. 7 In Evans, a transfer to the remaindermen did take
place, although the interest received was of limited marketability.
In light of the general principles of property law set forth by the
court, it is difficult to understand the court's reluctance to assess
tax liability upon this transfer.
In interpreting the particular statute dealing with contingent
or limited interests,'" the court felt that "a purely linguistic analy-
'"In Evans, the Tax Commissioner, relying on W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-2-2 to
-5 (1966), valued the life estate with power of disposal at $16,232.29 and the remain-
der at $58,730.21. The court refused to accept this assessment whereby the remain-
der interest was valued at three and one-half times the interest of the life tenant
with power of disposal. In noting the unfairness of the assessment, the court failed
to consider the effect of W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-2 (1966), which establishes the
primary rates to be applied in taxing interests. These rates are dependent upon the
blood relationship between the decedent and the beneficiary. The life estate in
Evans was bequeathed to the testatrix's husband, who would be taxed at 3% of the
market value of his interest, while the remaindermen, who were nephews of the
testatrix, would be taxed at 7%. This certainly has a great effect on the final tax
liability and should be taken into account by the court. In addition, the court stated
that if it were to adopt the Tax Commissioner's view, "an impecunious remainder-
man in the same circumstances as the remaindermen in this case would be immedi-
ately obligated to the executor of an estate for payment of taxes on an interest in
property which, at the time of assessment, had no fair market value." 194 S.E.2d
at 382. Such a reference to an impoverished remainderman is irrelevant to the case
before the court. Furthermore, the tax laws should not be rewritten to respond to a
particular factual situation, especially one which has not yet been presented to the
court.
'"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-5 (1966).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-1 (1966) specifically provides that "a tax, payable
into the treasury of the State, shall be imposed upon the transfer, in trust, or
otherwise, of any property, or interest therein, real, personal, or mixed. . . ." In
In re Estate of Hayman, 142 W. Va. 712, 714, 98 S.E.2d 273, 274-75 (1957), the court
stated in reference to the above statute: "It is significant, we think, that the tax is
imposed on the 'transfer' and not on the property or on the several items or classes
of property transferred."
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-7 (1966).
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sis" of the word "only," contained within the phrase granting the
taxing authorities the right to apportion taxes where "only a life
estate, or an interest for a term of years, or a contingent interest"
is involved, would not be beneficial. 9 Instead the court relied on
its economic analysis and concluded that the word "only" modi-
fied a single compound noun-life estate. On the other hand, ex-
amination of vocabulary and grammatical construction has often
been recognized by the court as a means by which an ambiguous
statute can be clarified, °2 and such an analysis results in a different
construction. In placing "only" ahead of several compound nouns,
the word modifies not just "life estate," but "an interest for a term
of years" and "a contingent interest" as well.
Considering this section of the statute as a whole, the interpre-
tation given to the word "only" no longer seems proper.' The court
construed the word "only" to limit the applicability of the statute
to a simple life estate-a life estate with implied prohibitions
'"The court noted: "In order to derive the legal effect of the word 'only' a purely
linguistic analysis would not be instructive; however, an analysis of the economic
consequences to the respective parties of differing tax treatment leads to but one
reasonable interpretation of the word 'only' ". 194 S.E.2d at 381.
"'In Pond Creek Pocahontas Co. v. Department of Mines, 137 W. Va. 864, 74
S.E.2d 590 (1953), an action was brought to construe a statute regulating coal
mining. The court stated in syllabus point four that "[i]n ascertaining the intent
of the Legislature in the enactment of a statute and determining whether it is
unambiguous, the grammatical construction, while not controlling, is an important
aid." In that case, the court even diagrammed the particular section of the statute
in question in order to clarify its meaning. Accord, State ex rel Ballard v. Vest, 136
W. Va. 80, 65 S.E.2d 649 (1951). Ballard was a mandamus action to compel the
State Medical Licensing Board to permit the relator to take the examination for a
license to pratice chiropractic, wherein the court looked to grammatical construc-
tion in analyzing the statute.
Indeed, such analysis was used by the court in a decision rendered after the
Evans opinion. In determining that the amended provision of W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-7-6 (1966) did not apply to wrongful death actions wich occurred prior to the
effective date of the amendment, Justice Neeley relied on grammatical construction
and diagrammed the sentence in question. Rosier v. Garron, Inc., 199 S.E.2d 50 (W,
Va. 1973).
2"Ex parte Watson, 82 W. Va. 201, 95 S.E. 648 (1918), was a habeas corpus
proceeding wherein the court applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (whereby
"[tihe meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words,"
BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1209 (4th ed. rev. 1968)) in construing a statute defining
a mayor's jurisdiction. The court explained "it is not unusual, in the interpretation
of statutes, to find words and phrases limited in meaning and effect, by necessary
implication arising from some other words or clauses. What is implied in a statute,
will, deed or contract is as much a part of it as what is expressed." 82 W. Va. at
205, 95 S.E. at 649.
[Vol. 76
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against waste and sale.22 However, this construction cannot be
applied consistently to a contingent interest or a term of years, for
neither interest is ever characterized in terms of a power of disposal
or power of sale. If the word "only" is held applicable to contingent
estates and estates for a term of years as well as life estates, the
proper construction requires broad application of the statute to the
three general estates. Thus, the Tax Commissioner could be re-
quired to apportion taxes where a life estate, contingent estate, or
estate for years is involved, and this interpretation would include
all types of life estates.
The most obvious tool that can be utilized to determine the
scope or meaning of any statute is an examination of legislative
intent.13 Unfortunately, legislative debates and committee reports
are not published in West Virginia, and newspaper accounts de-
vote little space to the legal ramifications of any legislation. Legis-
lative history often provides a clue to such intent,24 but, because
of the checkered history of West Virginia's tax code, this approach,
too, produces little information.2 The present statute, dealing with
taxation of contingent and limited interests, was enacted in 1904
as part of a general revision of the State's tax code. 26 The Legisla-
ture was concerned primarily with the upcoming State and na-
tional elections, and voting and legislative maneuvering were defi-
nitely affected by party interests. From the newspaper accounts,
21 American Law of Property § 2.16(e) (A.J. Casner ed. 1952):
The life tenant, as we have seen, is bound so to maintain the property as
to turn it over to the remainderman or reversioner substantially undimin-
ished in value through any act or default of his. Clearly this bars any act
of destruction or damage which permanently reduces the value of the
property.
"Hampton L.F. Ry. v. Noel, 300 F. 438 (4th Cir. 1924) (concerning
the construction of a section of the Internal Revenue Code); Superior
Steel Corp. v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 202, 136 S.E. 666 (1927) (dealing
with the construction of a statute relating to the state franchise tax).
2'American Airlines, Inc. v. Battle, 181 Va. 1, 23 S.E.2d 796 (1943)
(action testing the constitutionality of a gasoline purchase tax on airplane
fuel sold within the Commonwealth).
2In re Newberry's Estate, 138 W. Va. 296, 75 S.E. 2d 851 (1953),
involved a proceeding to determine whether proper assessment of inheri-
tance tax had been made. The court rejected reliance on decisions of
other states or on legislative history because "Acts of the Legislature,
dealing with inheritance taxes in this state, have been numerous and
varied. We think a history thereof not very helpful. Decisions of other
states are helpful only where statutes considered are similar to the statute
under consideration here." Id. at 299-300, 75 S.E.2d at 853.
2'Acts of the 21st Leg. ch. 6, Spec. Sess. (1904).
6
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there appears to have been little concern over the inheritance taxa-
tion statutes in general and none to section seven specifically."7
This statute is quite similar to the statute enacted in 1887,28 which
was patterned after the New York inheritance tax legislation of
1885,21 noted primarily for the numerous problems it created, in-
cluding problems dealing with taxation of contingent interests.
Perhaps because it is based on such an antiquated model, the West
Virginia statute dealing with the taxation of contingent and lim-
ited interests has no counterpart in the other forty-nine states or
in the District of Columbia. Therefore, court opinions from other
states offer no aid in discerning the legislative intent behind the
West Virginia statute.
Evidence relating to legislative intent being so limited, a look
at the theory or general purpose behind the statute appears to be
the only remaining method of analysis. Inheritance taxation was
initiated historically as a revenue raising mechanism," and the
fiscal demands of government far outweigh any distaste for guess-
work about the actual value of an interest." Even though the Tax
Commissioner is required to attach a value to an interest, certain
interests, particularly those limited in time or subject to particular
conditions, are exceedingly difficult to assess. Established meth-
2See Charleston Daily Mail, July 25, 1904 through August 8, 1904;
Charleston Daily Gazette, July 20, 1904 through August 10, 1904.
21Acts of the 14th Leg. ch. 31, Reg. Sess. (1887). The statute provides:
Whenever any estate, real, personal, or mixed, of a decedent shall be
subject to the tax mentioned in the preceding section, and there be only
a life estate, or an interest for a term of years, or a contingent interest
given to one party, and the remainder or reversionary interest to another,
the circuit court of the county in which administration is granted, shall,
on the application of the personal representative by petition, after due
notice to the parties interested, determine, in its discretion, and at such
time as it shall think proper, what proportion each party who may be thus
interested in said estate or property shall pay of said tax, and every such
party shall pay to the clerk of the county court his proportion of said tax
within sixty days after the date of such determination, and any party
entitled in remainder or reversion shall be required to pay his portion
within the same time as if his interest had vested in possession.
21n Oakes, Development of American State Death Taxes, 26 IowA L. REv. 451,
465 (1941), the author noted that "the act of 1885 had simply reproduced the
Pennsylvania arrangements which . . . protected the interests of the state fairly
well in the case of certain but not in the case of contingent interests."
1Id. at 463.
3Karch, The Apportionment of Death Taxes, 54 HARV. L. REv. 10 (1940);
Comment, The Valuation of Future Interests in Estate and Inheritance Taxation,
47 YALE L.J. 1354 (1938) (hereinafter cited as Valuation of Future Interests).
[Vol. 76
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ods are provided for determining their extent and value, 2 but these
methods are not subject to outside variables, which, in many cases,
determine the final nature of the interest. Changes in the value of
the property or a shifting interest rate structure are factors not
considered.
31
More importantly for the instant case, however, factors affect-
ing the potential life span of the beneficiaries are not to be consid-
ered.3 1 Where a testator has devised the property to one taker for
life or for a term of years, with a vested remainder in another taker,
the taxing authority must determine the value of the property at
the testator's death. 5 This determination includes the estimated
values of both the limited estate and the remainder. The first taker
may die before or after the time estimated by the use of the mortal-
ity tables, and, as a result, render the prior tax assessment both
inaccurate and unjust.
The problem of assessment is further complicated when the
remainder interest is contingent or subject to divestment. When an
interest is contingent, both the time of vesting and the party or
parties who will take may be uncertain.3 In West Virginia inheri-
tance tax liability is determined both by the value of the estate and
by the relationship of the beneficiary to the deceased.3 1 While the
Tax Commissioner is provided with a tool, albeit somewhat faulty,
for assessing the duration and value of each interest involved, there
is simply no tool which will enable him to determine the benefici-
ary who will ultimately take.
3
1
3'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-2-1 (1966) provides that the value of a life estate
interest is to be ascertained on the basis of the present value of an annuity of 5%
per annum on the principal sum during the probable life of the individual. Life
expectancy is to be determined by the American Experience Table of Mortality
included in the statute.
13Karch, supra note 32.
"'See Valuation of Future Interests, supra note 32, at 1358.
35Some states do postpone assessment and payment, although the majority
require immediate assessment and payment. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-7 (1966)
places West Virginia in the majority.
"1 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See Bland v.
Davisson, 77 W. Va. 557, 88 S.E. 1021 (1916).
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-2 (1966).
3'The following example serves as a good illustration. The testator devised
Blackacre to his wife for life, remainder to his son, John, but if John predeceases
his mother, remainder to the testator's niece, Mary. At the testator's death, his
wife, son and niece are living. The remainderman cannot be ascertained until the
death of the testator's wife. Therefore, it is impossible for the Tax Commissioner
to determine the rate of taxation to be applied to the estimated value of the interest
8
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A remainder subject to divestment is equally difficult to as-
sess. While the party to whom the right is granted is determined,
it still remains uncertain whether that right will ever vest indefeas-
ibly. 9 A remainderman whose interest is subject to divestment
may never possess the property and, conversely, he may possess
the property above and beyond the period estimated by the taxing
authorities and for which he has paid tax.
Because of the problems inherent in establishing a tax on
these interests and because of the necessity of making such assess-
ments, inheritance tax statutes have been passed which provide
specific formulas for the taxation of contingent or limited interests.
This was apparently the purpose behind West Virginia Code chap-
ter eleven, article eleven, section seven, and the statute should be
interpreted in terms of a solution to the problem of taxing uncer-
tain interests.
Because West Virgihia provides a unique solution to the prob-
lem of taxation of undertermined interests, examination of stat-
utes from other jurisdictions is not helpful in determining particu-
lar legislative intent. However, examination may be quite helpful
in trying to assess the theory behind the statute, especially the
problems it was intended to remedy. Statutes in force in other
states seem to fall into four major categories," none of which has
satisfactorily solved the problem: 1) statutes that hold the assess-
ment of the tax against the remaindermen in abeyance until the
interest actually vests;4 2) statutes that assess the taxes against
necessary in assessing a tax on that portion of the estate.
"'1 American Law of Property § 4.35 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
"See Karch, supra note 32; Valuation of Future Interests, supra note 32.
"Under this procedure, taxation of future interests is held in abeyance until
the beneficiary takes possession. The executor or administrator is generally re-
quired to post bond or put up securities to insure payment. Valuation of Future
Interests, supra note 32. ORE. REv. STAT. § 118.150 (1971), dealing with the evalua-
tion of particular interests, serves as a good example:
When an interest is contingent, defeasible or of such a nature that its true
cash value cannot sooner be ascertained, it shall be determined at the
time when the value first becomes ascertainable, at its true cash value
as of the date of decedent's death and without diminution for or on
account of any valuation made or tax paid theretofore upon the particular
estates upon which the devise, bequest, legacy or gift may have been
limited. . ..
The use of this method creates a number of problems. The tax is not administered
easily and remains unpopular with administrators who must remain personally
liable until all taxes are paid. The taxes are often forgotten, resulting in a loss of
revenue to the state. In addition, the postponement of evaluation limits the chance
[Vol. 76
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the remaindermen immediately at the highest possible rates;42 3)
statutes that assess the taxes against the remaindermen immedi-
ately at the lowest rate with security posted to cover taxation at
the highest rate;4 3 4) and statutes that assess the taxes immedi-
to take advantage of the federal estate tax credit. See Karch, supra note 32. This
method creates a particular problem where the life tenant is granted a power of
consumption. Where the estate is almost entirely consumed by the first taker, the
state taxing authority is placed in the position of either losing revenue or taxing a
remainderman for an interest which he never receives. Valuation of Future Inter-
ests, supra note 32.
"2Under this formula, a refund is granted when the remainder vests in a benefi-
ciary who would be taxed at a lower rate. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-19
(1972) provides:
When property is transferred or limited in trust or otherwise, and the
rights, interest, or estate of the transferees or beneficiaries are dependent
upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or in part
created, defeated, extended, or abridged, a tax shall be imposed upon
said transfer at the highest rate, within the discretion of the Revenue
Commissioner, which on the happening of any of the said contingencies
or conditions would be possible under the provisions of this Article, and
such tax so imposed shall be due and payable forthwith out of the prop-
erty transferred, and the Commissioner of Revenue shall assess the tax
on such property.
This approach, too, is not without problems. The New York court, discussing a
similar New York statute enacted in 1896, pointed out that since the tax is paid
from the corpus of the estate, the income of the life tenant will be diminished by
the interest on the amount of the tax. When the future interest vests in such manner
that a lower rate could have been applied, a refund is provided, but the life tenant,
the party to whom the refund should rightfully go, is of course dead and unable to
enjoy it. Paying the refund to his estate does not rectify the situation, particularly
where that income would have provided a necessary means of support for the life
tenant. In re Brez's Estate, 172 N.Y. 609, 64 N.E. 958 (1902). Even the remainder-
man may never get the advantage of a refund, for with the passage of time and
oversight, no one may ever seek repayment. Karch, supra note 32.
3For example, R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-22-20 (1970) provides:
When property is transferred or limited, in trust or otherwise, and the
rights, interests or estate of the transferees or beneficiaries are dependent
upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or in part
created, defeated, extended or abridged, a tax shall be imposed upon
such transfer at the lowest rate which on the happening of such contin-
gencies or conditions would be possible under the provisions of this chap-
ter, and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable forthwith by the
executors or trustees out of the property transferred; provided, however,
that on the happening of any contingency or condition whereby said
property or any part thereof is transferred to a person who under the
provisions of this chapter is required to pay a tax at a higher rate than
the tax imposed, then such transferee shall pay the difference between
the tax imposed and the tax at the higher rate, and the amount of such
increased tax shall be enforced and collected as provided in this chapter.
10
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ately with alternative methods of payment."
As noted above, the approach of the West Virginia statute is
somewhat different. The Tax Commissioner may, either on request
or on his own initiative, apportion taxes, assessing to each benefici-
ary his "proper share," and require immediate payment by the
parties.45 This method clearly lacks the sophistication of the meth-
ods described above, although it may provide much neded flexibil-
ity absent in the other statutes. First, it requires immediate assess-
ment and payment, thereby assuring revenue for the State, per-
mitting the taxpayer to take advantage of the federal estate tax
credit, and limiting the period for which an executor or administra-
tor must remain liable. Furthermore, it does not restrict the Tax
Commissioner to assessing the interest at either the highest or
lowest rate, but, rather, seems to permit him to consider any num-
ber of factors in arriving at what would appear to be the most
probable rate. If carefully administered, many of the problems and
inequities resulting from a fixed standard may be alleviated.
If the West Virginia statute dealing with the taxation of lim-
This method saves the life tenant from lost income which would result if the tax
was assessed at the highest rate but proves to be extremely burdensome administra-
tively. Karch, supra note 32.
11OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5731.25 (Page 1973) provides:
If the value of a reversionary or remainder interest in property is included
under Chapter 5731. of the Revised Code in the value of the gross estate,
the payment of the part of the tax imposed by Chapter 5731. of the
Revised Code attributable to such interest may, at the election of the
executor, administrator, or any other person liable for such tax, be post-
poned until six months after the termination of the precedent interest or
interests in property. The amount, the payment of which is so postponed,
shall bear an interest at the rate of three per cent per annum from the
date fixed for payment of the tax, which interest shall be paid by the
person liable for the tax in addition to the tax. The postponement of such
amount shall be under rules and regulations prescribed by the tax com-
missioner, and shall be upon condition that the executor, administrator,
or any other person liable for the tax, gives bond to the county treasurer
in such amount, and with such sureties as the tax commissioner deems
necessary, conditioned upon the payment within six months after the
termination of such precedent interest or interests of the amount, the
payment of which is so postponed, together with interest thereon, as
provided in this section.
Again, the refund will be of no benefit to the life tenant, who will be dead before
the future interest is determined, Karch, supra note 32, and the administrator or
executor again will have to remain personally liable for the amount of the tax if he
chooses to postpone final payment.
'SW. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-7 (1966).
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ited and contingent interests is viewed in light of this purpose, i.e.,
to provide the state with revenue by means which are both admin-
istratively feasible and reasonably just for the parties to be taxed,
it seems quite clear that the categorization of "life estate" must
include a life estate with power of disposal. First, the difficulty in
assessing the value and duration of such an estate, and, more
particularly, the value and duration of the vested remainder sub-
ject to divestment which follows it, is certainly no less than the
problems incurred in assessing a simple life estate, a term of years,
or a contingent interest. Second, a power of disposal or sale is
subject to extrinsic factors, and, perhaps more than any other
interest in land, will be controlled and determined by such factors.
Where a party is granted such a power, his present and potential
income, as well as his relationship with the subsequent takers,
often determines whether the power will be exercised. 6
If the statute is to cure the problem inherent in valuing inter-
ests upon which no absolute value can be affixed, then it must
include a life estate with power of disposal and power of sale. The
West Virginia statute, by merely requiring the taxing authorities
to assess each taker on the basis of his "proper share," seems to
allow the Tax Commissioner the power to analyze all factors and
to incorporate them into his assessment. By not being bound to the
strictures of applying the highest or lowest rate, the Tax Commis-
sioner presumably can render a more reasonable assessment
against all the beneficiaries.
Beyond the question of statutory construction, Evans presents
another problem of perhaps more serious proportions. The Evans
court, in holding that a life estate within the meaning of West
Virginia Code chapter eleven, article eleven, section seven did not
include a life estate with power of disposal, specifically limited its
decision to the instant statute, rejecting any application to cases
involving property law or other tax law." Yet by so limiting its
"The following example illustrates this point. T devised a life estate in Black-
acre to his wife with a power to sell or otherwise dispose of the property, remainder
to his son. When the wife has other sources of income and when she maintains a
good relationship with the son, it is unlikely that she will exercise the power to cut
off the son's rights. However, when the wife is experiencing or will experience
financial difficulties as the result of her husband's death, or when she has only
feelings of animosity toward the son, it is quite likely that she will exercise the
power either for her benefit or to the detriment of the son.
11194 S.E.2d at 382. The court held that "ftlhis case is limited in terms of
precedent exclusively to tax questions arising under Section 11-11-7 of the Code and
12
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decision, the court placed an area of West Virginia law in an anom-
alous situation: A life estate with power of disposal is classified as
a life estate under traditional property law concepts,4" except when
taxed under this particular statute, where it is considered to be
"greater than 'only a life estate.' ""s
By holding that the phrase "only a life estate" excluded a life
estate with power of disposal, the court failed to give adequate
consideration to the construction and purpose of the statute and
to the legal uncertainties which may result. By following the tradi-
tional laws of property and statutory construction and thereby
including a life estate with power of disposal within the category
of "only a life estate," a far better and indeed more workable result
would have been achieved.
Anne R. Williams
does not in any way interpret or change the law of real property or any other tax
law of this State."
"1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 111 (1936). West Virginia is in accord with this
view. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-16 (1966).
"The court appears to have inadvertently placed itself in a position similar to
that of the New York court which rendered Newman v. Dore, 276 N.Y. 371, 9
N.E.2d 966 (1937). In that case, T died, devising one-third of his real and personal
property in trust to provide the income thereof to his wife for life. Three days before
his death, however, the testator transferred all of his property into an inter vivos
trust fund, reserving to himself the right to the income for life as well as the power
to revoke. As a result, he died leaving no estate for his wife to share. The wife
challenged the validity of the transfer to the trustees. The trial court found the trust
agreement invalid. In affirming that decision, the court of appeals held:
We assume, without deciding, that except for the provisions of section 18
of the Decedent Estate Law [prohibiting a spouse from electing against
the will where the decedent placed one-third of his property in trust and
giving the income thereof to the spouse for life] the trust would be valid.
Id. at 380, 9 N.E.2d at 969. By holding that a trust, otherwise valid, was invalid as
to the wife's rights or interests in her husband's estate, the New York court found
itself governed by an unworkable concept. Subsequent decisions accepted or re-
jected the theory behind Newman, often on very limited grounds, causing great
uncertainty in New York law. The following developments provide the most telling
example. Murray v. Brooklyn Savings Bank, 258 App. Div. 132, 15 N.Y.S.2d 915
(1939), distinguished Newman on the issue of intestacy. In Murray the decedent
transferred most of his property to savings accounts to be held in trust for persons
other than his wife and died intestate. The court refused to apply the rule in
Newman because the decedent in that case left a will. In a later case, Schnakenberg
v. Schnakenberg, 262 App. Div. 234, 28 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1941), the court felt con-
strained to reject the theory of Murray. The decedent in that case created an inter
vivos trust of all his property, reserving the income for life and the right to revoke
and left a will devising his entire estate to charity. The wife challenged the trust
agreement, and the court, relying on Newman, held the trust to be invalid.
[Vol. 76
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Like Newman, the Evans decision defines an interest and limits its definition
to a particular situation. The confusion which resulted in New York may be the
end result of Evans as well.
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